CMP-SPRCM-74-22

SELECTIONS FROM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAGAZINES

American Consulate General
Hong Kong, B. C. C.

November 18, 1974

U. I. C. C.
JAN 14 1975
LIBRARY

DISTRIBUTED BY:

NTIS

National Technical Information Service
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

CMP-SPRCM-74-22

Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines

American Consulate General
Hong Kong, B.C.C.

No. 798
November 18, 1974

This edition is printed in the United States of America for dissemination in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the west coast of Africa from material produced by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong. All queries concerning this edition should be sent to:

National Technical Information
Service (152.12)
U.S. Department of Commerce
Springfield, Virginia 22151

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Selections from Study and Criticism)

Page

Read Han Fei's Chapter "Fixing the Law" - by Sun Kuo-ti and others 1

"Lao Tzu" Is a Military Work - by Chai Ch'ing 7

The Development of Ironware and Class Struggles in the Warring States, Ch'in and Han Period - by Wei Chin 17

Formulating and Implementing a Program Is a Profound Ideological Revolution - by Li Chün 27

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Study & Criticism, No. 8, Aug. 20, 1974 34

Study & Criticism, No. 9, Sept. 20, 1974 36

* * *

Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023

https://archive.org/details/selections-from-prc-magazines_1974-11-18_22

Read Han Fei's Chapter "Fixing the Law"

by

Sun Kuo-ti (孙国弟), Sun Yu-hsin (孙友信) and
Kuo Wen-chu (过文珠)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'an-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 10, October 20, 1974)

Living in the late Warring States period and the chief exponent of pre-Ch'in Legalist theories, Han Fei took the stand of the newly emerging landlord class in studying both the contemporary and historical experiences of class struggle. He critically assimilated the fruits of thought of the early Legalists and founded a relatively complete set of rule-of-law theories organically combining "law," "political tactics" and "authority."

In "Han Fei Tzu," a work consisting of more than 100,000 characters, the chapter "Fixing the Law (定法)" is an important one insofar as it elucidates in a relatively concentrated manner the theories pertinent to the rule of law. While emphasizing the importance of "law" and the necessity of combining "law" with "political tactics," the chapter makes a concrete analysis of the drawbacks in separating "law" from "political tactics." It provides the newly emerging landlord class with a mighty theoretical weapon for its victorious march. Han Fei's "law" consists of policies, laws and regulations giving expression to the political and economic interests of the newly emerging landlord class, actually referring to the political line of the newly emerging landlord class. "Political tactics" consist of the ways and means of appointing and dismissing, observing, rewarding and punishing government officials at various levels, actually referring to the strategy and measures guaranteeing the organizational consolidation of the newly emerging landlord class. When Han Fei said that "law" and "political tactics" were "indispensable to each other," this, from the Marxist point of view, means that it was only by relying on a correct political line and organizational consolidation was it impossible to beat the restoration activities of the declining slave-owning class as well as consolidating and developing the victories already gained by the rising landlord class.

The Confucian-Legalist struggle, which Han Fei personally experienced in the state of Han, was in essence a struggle between the declining slave-owning class and the rising landlord class, between restoration and counter-restoration, and a life-and-death battle between two classes and two lines. The chapter "Fixing the Law" was an outcome of this struggle.

"Fixing the Law" first analyzes the conditions of the political and ideological struggle in the state of Han, which was one of the states among the seven in the late Warring States period to carry out the Legalist line and introduce progressive reforms relatively early. As early as 536 B.C., Tzu-ch'an of the state of Cheng (Han destroyed Cheng and took over its land) was the first to cast tripods inscribed with the penal code. He

was followed by Cheng Hsi, who invented a new penal code of law, which was known as "chu hsing" (竹刑). In 403 B.C. when "Tsin was divided into three states," Han, Chao and Wei, the transition to the feudal system was in the main accomplished. This state of affairs continued down to 355 B.C. when Marquis Chao of Han appointed the Legalist politician Shen Pu-hai as prime minister and a big stride was taken in the reform by the landlord class. According to "Shen Pu-hai, Historical Records," during the more than a decade in which Shen was prime minister, "laws were reformed at home and princes were subdued abroad," and the goal of "making the state orderly and the army strong" was initially achieved at one time. However, as Han had just been divided from Tsin governed under the slave system, the contradictions between the slave-owning class and the landlord class, between the new and the old, were quite violent. As Han Fei described the situation, "Before the old laws of Tsin were abolished, the new laws of Han were introduced. Before the regulations of the former rulers were rescinded, those of the new were issued." Although Shen Pu-hai effected some reforms to "the old laws of Tsin" and the "regulations of the former rulers," yet he failed to grasp the essence of the line struggle between reform and counter-reform and failed also to advance effective legal measures to enforce the "new laws of Han" and the "regulations of the new rulers." Instead, he dwelt exclusively on the "political tactics" of employing people in government service, with the emphasis on discerning and ferreting out several "evil ministers." This caused the failure of the reform. Therefore, not long after Shen Pu-hai's death, the adverse current of restoration hung over the state of Han like dark clouds and engulfed it entirely. During the reign of King Hsüan Hui and King Hsiang of Han, power was actually in the hands of Kung Chung-ming, Kung Shu and other nobles of the royal household. This group of "chung jen" (high officials holding power) "acted wilfully without authority, satisfied their selfish ends at the expense of the law, enriched their families by wasting the resources of the state, and were as powerful as their ruler." ("Solitary Indignation") They were bent on seeking the private interests for a handful of slave-owning nobles. The triumph of the restoration activities of the slave-owning nobles led to the decline of the forces of the rising landlord class in the state of Han. Seeing "Han on the decline" ("Han Fei," Historical Records), Han Fei, as a thinker of the rising landlord class, naturally wanted to find the theoretical answer to the real cause of this situation.

Why did Shen Pu-hai's reform produce minimal results and why was it that initial achievements gained were later lost? Han Fei believed that this was the result of "practicing political tactics without laws." Shen Pu-hai assisted Marquis Chao of Han in ruling the state with "political tactics," but even after more than a decade of painstaking efforts, "Marquis Chao did not succeed in becoming a dictator," the main reason being that he was "not good at applying the law and was not constant in administering his regulations." That is to say, simply relying on pure organizational measures without thoroughly implementing a correct political line explained why it was basically impossible to settle the question of preventing the restoration of reactionary forces.

While Marquis Chao of Han was using Shen Pu-hai to introduce reform in the state of Han, Duke Hsiao of Ch'in employed Shang Yang to carry out reform in the state of Ch'in in a sweeping manner. Han Fei highly appraised the historical merit of Shang Yang's reform. He said: "While Kungsun Yang was governing Ch'in, the people were made mutually responsible for each other, and those who failed to report a criminal would be punished. His rewards were rich and doled out as promised. His punishments were heavy and were sure to be meted out. Therefore, the people labored hard without complaint and bravely resisted invading enemies. That was why the state was rich and its army strong." He ardently sang the praises of every policy adopted by Shang Yang to enforce the rule of law. However, some problems were also encountered in the course of Shang Yang's reform. "There was no way to know evil, and the wealth of the state went to the ministers." In other words, due to lack of a "way" to "know evil," some slave-owning nobles who wormed their way into the inner council of the Ch'in court usurped the fruits of the reform. In the hundred years after Shang Yang's death, the state of Ch'in did not change its line of rule of law ("After the death of Duke Hsiao and Lord Shang, King Hui ascended the throne but the laws of Ch'in were not defeated"), but the evil ministers were able to make use of the wealth and might of the state of Ch'in to satisfy their private desires in the name of public interest and expand their feuds, thereby giving rise to the situation in which "when a war was won, the great ministers were honored; when land was acquired, it was incorporated into their feuds."

Why did Shang Yang's reform fail to help found the empire and why were the wealth and might of the state of Ch'in utilized by evil ministers to expand the forces of the slave-owning aristocracy? Han Fei believed that this was the outcome of "practicing laws without political tactics." Shang Yang was resolute in presiding over the reform and was also harsh in suppressing the slave-owning nobles. But as he did not have a set of strategic measures to insure the thorough implementation of the line of rule by law, there being "no way to know evil," slave-owning nobles who had laid low took the opportunity to come out. This was the crux of the problem.

Facts of the struggle in both states of Han and Ch'in demonstrate from two different angles that just as it won't do to "have political tactics without law," so it won't do to "have laws without political tactics." Han Fei had waged a firm struggle against Mencius, Lü Pu-wei and men like them who attacked the landlord class reform in the Warring States period. But he did not blindly affirm everything; instead, he took an analytical attitude. On the one hand, he fully confirmed the reform theories and practice of Shang Yang, Shen Pu-hai and other early Legalists; on the other, he found out the faults from their reforms. He perceived that both Shen and Yang, "the two masters, failed to perfect their laws and political tactics." In Han Fei's opinion, Shang Yang was deficient in that "although laws were diligently imparted to officials, the ruler did not have the political tactics to control them." Shen Pu-hai's deficiency was the other way round. "Although political tactics were applied from above, laws were not diligently imparted to officials."

The reform theories of Shen and Shang were derived from practice, and their imperfect aspects were exposed after they were tested by practice. This is not odd. According to the Marxist theory of knowledge, "Often, correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness, and then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice." This is also true of the process in which the Legalist theories in history gradually turned from being imperfect to being relatively perfect. By Han Fei's time, that is, the late Warring States period, the practice of reform by the newly emerging landlord class had become much richer in content than in the middle Warring States period where Shen Pu-hai and Shang Yang lived. That was why it was possible for Han Fei to reach a more perfect stage in the field of theory than both Shen and Shang. As a matter of fact, as the practice of reform more and more clearly revealed the drawback of separating "law" from "political tactics," Han Fei was able to recognize that like clothing and food, which "are essential to life," "laws" and "political tactics" were "indispensable" "tools of kings and emperors." Moreover, on the basis of practice of struggle in the late Warring States period, he critically inherited the achievements of his forerunners and worked out his theories organically combining "law" and "political tactics."

Han Fei particularly stressed "taking law as the foundation," ("Hidden Evil") thinking that "law" had decisive significance. In "Fixing the Law," he pointed out explicitly: "Laws and regulations are written by the government. Punishments which are meted out must be supported by the people. Rewards must be given carefully in consideration of the law. Evil officials must be punished, so that all officials will obey the law." He also stated: "Laws are recorded in documents which are kept in the government office and are promulgated among the common people." ("Three Difficulties") All this means: The policies, laws and regulations of the rising landlord class must be publicized with fanfare, so that the line of rule of law will have the support of the people and be carried out by one and all; furthermore, with the observance or violation of this line as the criterion for judging right from wrong, rewards and penalties must be handed out with meticulous care. In the final analysis, "law" as explained by Han Fei meant the dictatorship of the landlord class. It of course had the aspect of savagely suppressing the peasants, an aspect determined by the nature of the landlord class. But judging from the way in which Han Fei stressed that "the law makes no exception for men of high station" and "when faults are to be punished, the highest minister cannot escape" ("On Having Standards"), the prime target of the law at that time was the slave-owning aristocrats seeking restoration and this had a certain progressive meaning in history. It should be said that it was only with such a correct political line opposing restoration and regression that it was possible to formulate a set of strategic and organizational measures against restoration and regression.

The implementation of a correct line must be served by corresponding strategic and organizational measures for struggle. The harsh facts of the struggle between restoration and counter-restoration in the late

Warring States period caused Han Fei to see this more soberly. Although he criticized Shen Pu-hai for "failing to enforce laws with thoroughness" and talking only about "political tactics" in the appointment of officials, he did not mean that "political tactics" were not needed. On the contrary, he attached great importance to them. The chapter "Fixing the Law" points out: "Political tactics concern appointment of officials who should be vested with authority in accordance with their positions. The ruler should punish them if they are found guilty and should promote only the worthy among them." He believed that "political tactics" must not be neglected under all circumstances. He meant to say that official posts should be filled by people according to their abilities, so that officials at various levels could really discharge their duties. This was actually a personnel line of "appointing only the worthy." In addition, officials should be placed under secret scrutiny. Specifically, this meant the need to discern political swindlers like the Confucianists, to prevent careerists and conspirators of the slave-owning class from usurping power. In stressing this, Han Fei learned the lesson obtained at the cost of the blood of the Legalists, a lesson which had clearcut epochal characteristics. Take the state of Han, the home country of Han Fei, for example. At that time, "influential people" who wormed their way into the political organ had the Legalists either "executed by the public law" or "assassinated." ("Solitary Indignation") They did not wink an eye in killing people. Repression, attack and frame-up always followed the political activities of the Legalists, and Han Fei himself faced the threat to "his body." ("On Farming") Therefore, it was no accident that Han Fei should stress the need for "political tactics" to serve "law."

In class society, a progressive political line and revolutionary tactical measures always exist in direct opposition to a reactionary political line and counter-revolutionary tactical measures. The "law" of Han Fei and other Legalists was directed at the Confucian "propriety" and their "political tactics" at the Confucian "evil." Hence, the theories on the rule of law were essentially theories of dictatorship exercised by the rising landlord class over the slave-owning class. It was Han Fei who was the first Legalist to advance comprehensive rule-of-law theories organically combining law, political tactics and authority during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.

Han Fei's chapter "Fixing the Law" occupies an important place in the history of Legalist thought in the whole of Chinese feudal society. Combined with the chapter "The Difficulties of authority" (难势), it basically completed an integral rule-of-law ideological system "taking law as the foundation." This set of theories produced a huge material force in Ch'in Shih Huang's revolutionary practice of unifying the six states. In founding a united feudal country with centralized power, Ch'in Shih Huang mainly relied on a correct rule-of-law line, and he had a good fighting group with such Legalists as Li Ssu and Liao Wei as its hardcore. After Ch'in, Legalists including Sang Hung-yang, Ts'ao Ts'ao and Liu Tsung-yüan had all highly recommended and affirmed the ideas of "law" and "political tactics" as propounded in Han Fei's chapter "Fixing the Law." It can be said that this chapter was like a sharp steel knife in the hands of the Legalists.

To be sure, as a theoretical essay of the landlord class, "Fixing the Law" naturally has its class limitations. Han Fei was a brave theoretical fighter in the struggle against the restoration of the slave system. But after all he was a member of the exploiting class. Since he failed to see the decisive role of the masses of the people in the fight against restoration of the slave system, he always felt lonely and weak. In "Fixing the Law" he said that "if the ruler does not have political tactics, the faults lie above" and that "if the sovereign is not a political tactician, he will not be able to know evil." By saying this, he pinned the hope on a few landlord class chieftains, and that was one of the concrete expression of his limitations. However, judging by Marxist historical materialism, the ideas of "law" and "political tactics" stressed by Han Fei in the anti-restoration struggle during the late Warring States period were progressive all the same. In class society, a revolutionary class must have a correct ideological and political line and a set of correct strategic and organizational measures for struggle before it can defeat the counter-revolutionary classes. It was correct for Han Fei to pay serious attention to this. Chairman Mao has said: "To lead revolution to victory, a political party must rely on its own correct political line and consolidated organization." This is a Marxist conclusion drawn by Chairman Mao after summing up the experience of class struggle as a whole. The experience of our Party in defeating successive opportunist chieftains has repeatedly proved that this is a great truth. With the Marxist-Leninist line set by Chairman Mao and the revolutionary unity of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities across the country, we are sure to head for greater victories.

* * *

"Lao Tzu" Is a Military Work

by

Chai Ch'ing (翟青)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

In 1973 a number of ancient books written on silk having very high historical value were unearthed from Han Tomb No. 3 in Mawangtui, Changsha, Hunan. Among them were two editions, A and B, of "Lao Tzu" (老子).

"Lao Tzu," a representative work of the Taoists of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, was divided into two parts -- the "te" (德) classics and the "tao" (道) classics. In various editions passed down from the Han dynasty, the "tao" classics were invariably taken as the first part and the "te" classics as the second part. Hence, "Lao Tzu" was normally known as "Tao Te Ching" (道德经). In the two editions of "Lao Tzu" unearthed from Han Tomb No.3 in Mawangtui, however, the "te" classics were placed before the "tao" classics, proving that "Tao Te Ching" should read "Te Tao Ching." This archaeological finding is valuable in that it has not only furnished new precious material for restoring the book "Lao Tzu" to its original features, but has also provided us with a lot of enlightenment concerning the study of its ideological content.

Reflecting the trends of thought during the social upheaval in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, "Lao Tzu" was not penned by one man alone but had its own course in being written. This course ran parallel to that of social change and ideological development at that time. If we make a serious analysis of the concrete content of the "te" and "tao" classics in the book and the book's overall ideological system, we shall discover that from the birth of the "te" classics and the development from the "te" to the "tao" classics was reflected from one facet the course of social change and ideological development during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.

What kind of book is "Lao Tzu" at all? On this question, divergence of opinion has persisted all along. During the T'ang dynasty a man called Wang Chen believed that the "5-thousand character" "Lao Tzu" was "devoted to war in all its chapters." ("Summary of the Military Views of Tao Te Ching") In the Ming-Ch'ing period Wang Fu-chih also stressed its "military aspects" ("On Sung") when dealing with its historical role. In modern times Chang T'ai-yen also believed that "Lao Tzu," a work of 5 thousand characters, was "an elaboration of the gists of 'Chinpan' and 'Liu Tao' /both being military treatises/," ("The Confucian Way," Chiushu) stressing that it generalized the main themes of ancient military writings. It is no coincidence that from Wang Chen of T'ang dynasty to Wang Fu-chih of the late Ming dynasty and to the bourgeois revolutionist Chang T'ai-yen, "Lao Tzu" had consistently been regarded as a military writing. Out of a

total of 81 chapters, more than ten deal directly with war, nearly 20 touch on war in philosophical terms, and the other remaining chapters are also permeated by ideas of military strategy and tactics. Thus it is quite right and appropriate to view "Lao Tzu" as a military treatise. In his "Summary of the Military Views in Tao Te Ching," Wang Chen said that "Lao Tzu" "discusses military science directly in its latter dozen chapters." This is correct too. Wang Chen's remark was based on the edition which placed the "tao" classics before the "te" classics; hence the "latter dozen chapters" obviously refer to the "te" classics. That he believed that the "te" classics "discusses military science directly" meant to say that "Lao Tzu" dwells on war mainly in the "te" classics. In fact, Han Fei, a thinker of the newly rising landlord class in the late Warring States period, in his study of the strategy and tactics of the struggle against the declining slave-owning aristocracy, gave particular attention to the "te" classics in "Lao Tzu." He especially wrote two philosophical essays - "Understanding Lao Tzu" and "Learning from Lao Tzu" - in which he both criticized and remolded "Lao Tzu's" theories. When explaining or citing "Lao Tzu," he selected as key points 24 chapters of which six belonged to the "tao" classics and the rest to the "te" classics. In order of arrangement, too, the "te" classics were placed before the "tao" classics.

The fact that the essence of the military discussion in "Lao Tzu" is found in the "te" classics, which form the first part of the book, profoundly indicates the connection between it and the ancient military writings. Sun Wu's "Master Sun's Art of War" in the late Spring and Autumn period was the earliest military treatise in our country, a summation of the war experience in the Spring and Autumn period, dealing exclusively with military strategy and tactics with a lot of incisive views on the rules of war and their application to military operations. But it gives more emphasis to tactics. However, in dealing with war, "Lao Tzu" in its "te" classics, unlike "Master Sun's Art of War" which devotes considerable space to studying tactics, gives the emphasis to strategy, raising the military question to the level of strategic and tactical thinking of political struggle. Hence it has more general significance than "Master Sun's Art of War." This is an improvement. The "tao" classics, as the second part of "Lao Tzu," places all the rules of military and political struggles in the framework of the elusive "Tao" /Way/, and despite the fact that it has a great deal of simple dialectical factors and a certain value from the theory of knowledge, yet judging from its substance, it actually sinks into the quagmire of objective idealism. After a general review of the course from the "Art of War" to the "te" classics and then from the "te" to the "tao" classics, we may clearly see how the development of military operations in ancient times had propelled the development of the ancient military and political strategic thinking and had been swayed by the world outlook and stamped with a class brand in the course of theoretical generalization from the particular to the general and from the concrete to the abstract.

"Lao Tzu" as a military treatise is a product of the big social change in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Lenin said: "History warns us that every major issue and every revolution can only be settled by a series of wars." The transition from the slave to the feudal

system in our country was effected through a series of wars lasting for several centuries during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. In particular, wars during the Warring States period were more violent, frequent and larger in scale than those during the Spring and Autumn period. In waging a war, the so-called "states with ten thousand chariots" at that time often "were able to mobilize several hundred thousand troops and fought for years on end." ("Stratagem of Chao Part II, Strategems of the Warring States"), reflecting the vehemence and reversals of the contention. In the Spring and Autumn period, when Wu attacked Ch'u, its troops fought all the way into Ying, the capital of Ch'u, in merely about ten days. In the Warring States period, when Ch'i joined forces with Han and Wei and 200,000 troops were employed to attack Ch'u, "the war continued for five years before it ceased." ("Stratagem of Chao Part III, Stratagems of Warring States") It can be seen that wars in the Warring States period had developed to a more advanced stage compared with those in the Spring and Autumn period. And following the development of warfare, the improvement of weaponry and better offensive and defensive tactics, wars became still more complex in form. The direction of war became an art in its own right, and the problems of strategy occupied a still more important place. Sun Wu said: "War is a matter of vital importance to a state, bearing on its life or death, its survival or extinction. Therefore it must be seriously studied." ("Planning," Master Sun's Art of War) This reflected the prime importance to which people attached to the problems of war. Just as it requires a course for people to understand the laws of other things, so it requires one to understand the laws of war. It is only when the practice of war has been enriched, wars in various forms have repeatedly appeared, and all sorts of contradictions have become daily more exposed in the course of war that people's understanding of the laws of war can reach a higher level. "Lao Tzu," which was completed in the Warring States period, was precisely a product of a period of intermittant warfare. It not only reflected the actual conditions of war at that time in which "battles were fiercely fought in the fields," with large armies confronting with each other and wars were drawn out, and painted a dismal picture of fighting in which "where armies engaged each other, the place was reduced to ruins; after a large battle was fought, disastrous years would follow." But what was especially important was that it "recorded the causes, contemporary and historical, for the victories and defeats in war and the resultant fortunes and misfortunes." ("Treatise on Literature and Art," History of Han) From the rise and fall of a state and the ascent or descent of a class as caused by the victory or defeat in war was derived the knowledge about the laws of events. Therefore, "Lao Tzu" is not an ordinary military work by military men but a military-philosophical work by philosophers on military affairs.

"The soft and the weak defeat the tough and the strong" - this is a basic point of strategic thinking advanced by "Lao Tzu." This thinking of the weak defeating the strong is a generalization of the momentous social upheaval at that time. On the stage of history, the Chou dynasty, which was originally a colossus, was destroyed by the state of Ch'in which was developed from a small country in the west with a territory less than 50 li. During the Spring and Autumn period, the state of Wu was originally

a "barbarian" state with "little culture," but by the time of King Ho-lu, thanks to the stratagems of Wu Sun and Wu Tzu-hsu, "Wu had defeated the powerful Ch'u in the west, awed Ch'i and Tsin in the north, and subdued Yueh in the south." ("Wu Tzu-hsu," Historical Records) Wu then became a strong state "eminent among the princes." In the Warring States period, which was described by Wang Fu-chih as "a period of big social change," "states did not have fixed relations with each other, nor did a state have a fixed ruler." (Ku Yen-wu, "Jih Chih Lu 日知录," Vol. 13) The various powerful states all wanted to unify the whole of China, yet none had sufficient strength to do so. Consequently, stalemate ensued. In those years of frequent warfare, there were numerous examples of the strong being vanquished and of the weak defeating the strong. As "Master Sun's Art of War" stated, "weakness grows out of strength." And "Lao Tzu" went a step further and from the conflict and connection between opposites dialectically explained the transformation between strong and weak, holding that for "the weak to defeat the strong and the soft the tough" was a universal truth "well known to the world."

"Lao Tzu" is fond of illustrating the strategic thinking of the "soft and weak defeating the tough and strong" with the example of "water." "Nothing is weaker than water in the world, but nothing is better than water in beating the strong." Thus, "weakest things are capable of subduing the strongest things in the world." Ancient military men also often compared water with fighting. Sun Wu said: "The guiding principle in military tactics may be compared to that of war." Sun Pin also said: In fighting as in the flow of water, it was necessary to "get along with its principle," and not to "go against it." This is because water tends to flow from a high to a lower level, bypassing rocks and flowing downward irresistibly. By comparing the flow of water with military operations, military strategists meant that just as water adapts itself to the shape of the ground, the army should work out its plans for victory according to the condition of the enemy, stressing that in fighting a war one must, like water, adapt to the changes in the enemy's condition, avoiding his strength and attacking his weakness. When avoiding the enemy's strength, one might look soft and weak, but when attacking the enemy's weakness, one might look very tough and strong. Therefore, in the art of war warfare has no fixed rules just as water has no fixed form. Those who "are able to vary military tactics to win victories according to the changes of enemy's condition" might be compared to gods. By comparing military operations to the flow of water, "Lao Tzu," on the one hand, generalizes the military theories developed from practice and, on the other hand, further elaborates on the principle of political struggle that "the strong and powerful are in a disadvantageous position" and "the soft and weak are in an advantageous situation," thus philosophically explaining the conditions and possibilities essential for the soft and weak to defeat the tough and strong.

Proceeding from the strategic principle of the weak defeating the strong, "Lao Tzu" advances a set of tactics for subduing the enemy and winning the victory. It holds: "Before weakening the enem , first make him strong temporarily; before destroying him, first make him rise

temporarily; and before capturing his land, first make him gain something temporarily." This strategy of first conceding to the enemy and then subduing him is due to the fact that the weak is always in a defensive position. In order to preserve his military strength and force the enemy to head for ultimate defeat from temporary victory, it is necessary to retreat, cause the enemy to be in a passive position, and look for his weakness so as to destroy him when the opportunity arises. This strategic thinking was derived from the practice of war at that time. The Battle of Ch'engp'u between Tsin and Ch'u during the Spring and Autumn period was such a well-known example of war. When the war began, the army of Ch'u was in a superior position. In light of its comparative weakness, Tsin "retreated," conceding 90 li of land and thus avoiding the powerful thrust of the army of Ch'u. Then when the enemy became impatient and arrogant, it selected the two flanks of the enemy where his forces were weak and routed them one by one. To give and then take - this is a prerequisite for the weak to defeat the strong. On the surface, some places are lost, but in reality such tactics are aimed at luring the enemy to come out from his cave, knocking him behind closed doors, and finally recovering every inch of land. "Lao Tzu" sums up this method of fighting as a "subtle method." In the chapter "Learning from Lao Tzu," Han Fei said: "To start an undertaking without prior fixed rules and then accomplish great successes - this is a subtle way of doing things." What is meant by "accomplishing great successes" is the attainment of the strategic objective. When one appears to be "doing nothing" he is actually "doing something" - this is the essence of "making the soft win" as propounded in "Lao Tzu."

"Lao Tzu" stresses the need to "deploy troops by deceptive tactics," looking upon flexible varying of military tactics as an indispensable condition for attaining the strategic objective. War being an act of deception, it is necessary to create all sorts of false impressions to confuse and deceive the enemy so as to attack him where he is least prepared and when he least expects it. Only thus can one vanquish the enemy. Sun Wu's military treatise says: "War is primarily a game of deception." The stress "Lao Tzu" put on "deploying troops by deceptive tactics" is basically consistent with the viewpoint of the military strategist, and is a profound criticism of the Confucian tenet of "disciplining the army according to propriety" and their asinine benevolence, righteousness and virtue. A series of wars during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods prove that those who "discipline the army according to propriety" are sure to lose, while those who "use the troops by deceptive tactics" will win. The Battle of Hungshui between Ch'u and Sung during the Spring and Autumn period and the Battle of Maling between Ch'i and Wei in the Warring States period were a sharp contrast. In the Battle of Hungshui, Duke Hsiang of Sung played an asinine role. When the army of Sung was well arrayed and before the army of Ch'u had entirely crossed the Hungshui River, this was originally a most favorable time for a weaker state to defeat its enemy. However, Duke Hsiang, insisting on "benevolence and righteousness," argued that before the army of Ch'u had finished crossing the river, it should not be attacked. When it finished crossing the river and had not yet arrayed itself, Duke Hsiang, adhering to "benevolence and

righteousness," still said no. It was only when the enemy was in position that he ordered the attack. The upshot was that the army of Sung suffered a crushing defeat and Duke Hsiang himself was seriously wounded and almost captured by the enemy. Such was the outcome of "disciplining the army according to propriety." In the Battle of Maling, Sun Pin, chief of staff of the army of Ch'i, being "guided by the prevailing circumstances," kept the enemy on the run. While directing his army on the march, he had the number of stoves reduced every day, from 100,000 to 50,000 and then to 20,000. This created the false impression that over half of the army of Ch'i had deserted, and P'ang Chuan, the commander of the army of Wei, was deceived. When P'ang left his main force behind and led a small detachment to pursue the army of Ch'i, he was ambushed by the army of Ch'i at Maling. All his troops were wiped out, the crown prince of Wei, Shen, was killed, and he himself was captured. This was a victory for Sun Pin's "deceptive tactics."

Drawing on the positive and negative experiences and lessons of war, "Lao Tzu" profoundly amplifies the idea of "deploying troops by deceptive tactics." This finds outstanding expression in its dialectical explanation of the connection between "deception" and "frontal attack." It is stressed that a "frontal attack is for practice of deception." In waging a battle one may sometimes pretend to launch a frontal attack in order to attract the main force of the enemy's army, and then get behind him swiftly and annihilate him. This is what is meant by "coordinating with the frontal attack and winning the victory by deception." As explained by "Lao Tzu," "deploying troops by deceptive tactics" and "a frontal attack is for the practice of deception" are a further development of what Sun Wu says in his "Art of War" that "the tactics of war are no more than those of deception and frontal attack." The main thrust is that the weaker side must concentrate his armed forces to attack the weak spots of the stronger side and use his local superiority to defeat the local inferiority of the stronger side. But often this is beyond a reckless military planner. Therefore, "Lao Tzu" says: "A good military commander does not humiliate the enemy first and display all his skills in an arrogant manner." It also says: "A wise military commander always concedes a step first; he does not fight recklessly but overwhelms his enemy by surprise." In the views of the authors of "Lao Tzu," a battle is not only a battle of strength but also one of wits. Therefore, "a man of great wisdom looks like a fool." In fighting and on the march, one should be "good at concealing his intentions." One must not show the enemy where he is going. While holding a weapon in hand, one must act as if he did not have a weapon in hand. It is a great mistake for a commander to be arrogant and underestimate his enemy. "Lao Tzu" clearly states: "There is no greater fault than underestimating one's enemy, and to do so would cost one's life." It summarizes these tactical principles of concealing one's intentions, preserving one's actual strength and dealing blows to the enemy later as "tao yin" /concealing the way/. This has the same meaning as what "Master Sun's Art of War" says, that "when one is capable he must feign incapable; when one is active he must feign inactive."

As propounded in "Lao Tzu," the strategic thinking of the weak defeating the strong reveals to certain extent the dialectics inherent in the laws of war. However, compared with military writings in general, "Lao Tzu" has its own unique features. It goes beyond military struggle to speculate within a broader scope on the ties between movements of opposites in the world of nature and in human society. It more systematically reveals that things depend on each other for existence; for instance, the beautiful and the ugly, the high and the low, the big and the small, the difficult and the easy, the long and the short, the have and the have-not, the loss and the gain, the tough and the soft, the strong and the weak, the unfortunate and the fortunate, the glorious and the humiliated, life and death, victory and defeat, advance and retreat - all these are opposites of a unity. It also points out that when a thing develops to its limit, it would transform into its opposite. Chairman Mao, dealing with the transformation of contradictions, has this to say: "In given conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: 'Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good." This is a high appraisal of simple dialectics found in "Lao Tzu." However, the authors of "Lao Tzu," as political representatives of the lower strata of the declining slave-owning class, were the declining "soft and weak." Although they summed up the strategic thinking of "the weak defeating the strong" from the big social upheaval and vainly attempted to change their own soft and weak social positions in accordance with the principle of this thinking, actually this strategic thinking was useless to the declining class which they represented. Only a progressive class, conforming to the direction of historical development, can make the weak defeat the strong and vanquish all reactionary colossuses who appear to be very powerful outwardly.

For instance, with regard to the krowledge of the nature of war, the "tao" classics has this to say: "Those who assist their ruler with Tao do not prevail over the empire with wars." "War leads to disaster, not to be used by a man of virtue." Failing to differentiate between just and unjust wars and describing all wars as "disastrous" are an expression of the limitations of "Lao Tzu." Lenin said: "Although wars cause all sorts of calamities and hardships, they also bring considerable advantages: They ruthlessly expose, disclose and destroy many decadent, bad and moribund things in human institutions." "Lao Tzu" sees only the bad aspects of war and calls for returning to the society of a small country in which "although there are armors there is no place to store them." This is a regressive, negative and conservative idea. The appearance of this idea of fearing war in the war-torn years of the Warring States period reflected the characteristics of the class the Taoists represented. During the War States period the new landlord class was rising and flourishing with each passing day on the political stage. The slave-owning class was declining as a whole, and the lower strata of the slave-owners which the Taoists represented were the weakest of all, filled with endless misgivings about the big social change which gave rise to wars, and worried day and night that wars would bring a tragic end to their own class.

A completely different stand was taken by the Legalists as political representatives of the newly rising landlord class. Sun Pin contended that "it is impossible" to use "benevolence and righteousness" and "propriety and music" to "settle disputes," and instead called for "making a state strong through wars" and for settling problems through revolutionary violence. Shang Yang also maintained that "if wars can be eliminated by wars, they should be fought." ("Strategy," Book of Lord Shang) Han Fei was even more explicit when he raised the militant slogan "People of today vie to be known for strength," ("The Five Vermin," Han Fei Tzu) and called for giving rewards to people plowing the land and going to war. The positive attitude taken by the Legalists toward war reflected the confidence with which the newly rising landlords looked forward to the success of their feudal cause of unifying the empire. A comparison between the Legalists and the Taoists thus shows that the two adopted diametrically opposite attitudes toward war.

This military work "Lao Tzu" also differs from other military writings from the line of knowledge. Dealing with the art of war, both Sun Wu and Sun Pin summed up the experiences of war from the viewpoint of simple materialism and talked about the "way of using troops" in materialist terms. Yet not once did they depart from this concrete sphere of war, for they confined themselves to the knowledge of the laws of wars and to military dialectics. "Lao Tzu" puts the stress on probing and studying the strategic thinking, it deduces from the way of using troops the laws of ideas and the laws of development and changes of things in general. This is an improvement over the works by Sun Wu and Sun Pin on the art of war. However, such rich simple dialectical ideas are ultimately throttled by the system of objective idealism. This is its drawback compared with such military strategists as Sun Wu and Sun Pin. From the "art of war" to the "te" classics and then from the "te" to the "tao" classics, one can see how the authors of "Lao Tzu" suffered from class constraints and how they, from the theory of knowledge, sank step by step into the quagmire of objective idealism. This has enlightened us: the "te" and "tao" classics might not be written by the same person, perhaps not even by the same group of persons. When critically inheriting this historical heritage, "Lao Tzu," we must pay particularly serious attention to the study of the "te" classics.

Both the essence and dross can be seen in the set of strategic and tactical policies summed up from social change and chaos in "Lao Tzu." Proceeding from "Lao Tzu," people may head for two different directions. Different classes or different groups within the same class may make use of "Lao Tzu" after remodelling it and interpret it differently in accordance with their own needs.

Some progressive thinkers and statesmen in Chinese history had given attention to absorbing the valuable ideological nutrient from "Lao Tzu." Han Fei in the late Warring States period, with a view to developing the newly rising landlord class' militant spirit of "being capable of resisting all adversities" and "defeating all foes," paid particularly serious attention to a study of "Lao Tzu," on the basis of which he wrote

two militant philosophical essays - "Understanding Lao Tzu" and "Learning from Lao Tzu." In the early Han dynasty, such Legalist representatives as Empress Lü, Emperor Wen and Ch'ao Ts'o, in order to consolidate the victories of the landlord class, donned the "Taoist" cloaks and engaged in the "doing nothing and yet doing everything" politics which was Taoist in appearance but Legalist in substance. By the Sung dynasty, Wang An-shih, the reformer of the landlord class,wrote "Annotations of Tao Te Ching," which, according to Wang Fu-chih's "On Sung," particularly praised the strategic thinking of "Lao Tzu" as "wonderful strategy." As for Wang Fu-chih himself, he produced the book "On Lao Tzu," in which he developed his own materialist ideology and progressive political views.

Some reactionary thinkers and statesmen in Chinese history likewise gave attention to studying "Lao Tzu." A contemporary of Han Fei, Lü Pu-wei learned from "Lao Tzu's prizing the soft" and formed his way of extending and coiling in playing power politics. ("Fidelity," Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lü) The bourgeois revolutionist Chang T'ai-yen pointed out: The book "Lao Tzu" "serves as a book of reference by the conspirators of later generations," (The Confucian Way," Chiushu) beginning with such Confucian political swindlers as Lü Pu-wei.

"Lao Tzu" has a maxim: "Those who know others are wise, and those who know themselves are brilliant." This is so with commanding a war, and may also be applied to the sphere of the theory of knowledge. Man's knowledge of the world always consists of two aspects - "knowing others" and "knowing oneself." However, the authors of "Lao Tzu," although they proceeded from an analysis of the social contradictions in their time and advanced a great many valuable views on the strategy and tactics of political and military struggles, were nevertheless thinkers of the exploiting class. It would not be easy for them to truly understand the society of mankind and the class to which they belonged. "Lao Tzu" also states: "Those who prevail over others have strength; those who prevail over themselves are strong." This is a truth which is still applicable today. What is meant by "prevailing over oneself" means overcoming one's weaknesses, shortcomings and mistakes, and those who are able to do this are strong and powerful. Yet, in spite of their saying this, the authors of "Lao Tzu" were unable to overcome their exploiting-class bias. Such is historical dialectics.

The proletariat, being different from all exploiting classes of the past, is able to master its own destiny. Guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, the broad masses of people are fully capable of scientifically knowing the laws of human and historical development, correctly knowing wars and their laws, and correctly and appropriately evaluating the various schools of thought and tides of thought that have appeared in history. Ancient military thinking in our country is a rich treasure store; it has been superbly studied and analyzed by our great leader Chairman Mao in his many splendid military writings. Today, when we are studying Chairman Mao's military writings, to sum up the ancient military thinking of our country with the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method and on the basis of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat

it will surely behoove us to make a better study of the struggle between two ideologies and two lines in the military field, further criticize Lin Piao's bourgeois military line, and continue to deepen and broaden the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius.

* * *

The Development of Ironware and Class Struggles in the Warring States, Ch'in and Han Periods

by

Wei Chin (卫今)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 10, October 20, 1974)

The revolution in the relations of production is caused by the development of the productive forces. Yet, any large-scale development of the productive forces always follows the change in the relations of production. Therefore, before each major change in the history of human society, the revolutionary class invariably first prepares the public opinion, seizes political power, changes the old relations of production, and then proceeds to develop the productive forces on a large scale. This is a law of history.

This is proved by the fact that China's archaeological findings from the enormous work of underground excavation since liberation have further disclosed the process of development of ironware in ancient China. To examine and analyze this process, study the history of the struggle between the Confucian and the Legalist schools, and understand the tremendous effects the change in the old superstructure and the old relations of production had exerted on the development of the social productive forces will help us understand more clearly Chairman Mao's great teaching, "Grasp revolution, promote production and other work and promote preparations against war" and penetratingly criticize the theory of productive forces trumpeted by Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and other political swindlers like them.

I

The laboring people in ancient China had learned how to use iron long ago. A metal axe, unearthed from a tomb of a slave owner of the Shang Dynasty at T'aihsi village in Kaoch'eng hsien, Hopei province, in 1972, dated back to the early period of the Yin culture in the 14th-13th Centuries B.C. This metal axe does not look like a practical weapon, but like an ornament for funeral service. The iron of the metal axe, as a scientific test shows, was shaped by heating and forging. But whether it was formed by the refining process remains to be studied. The discovery of this metal axe shows that the Chinese laboring people of more than three thousand years ago had already begun to make tools of iron; it also shows that this kind of metal was a very rare and precious metal which did not exist in large quantities and was possessed only by the slave-owning aristocrats.

As seen from underground excavations, social and production conditions in the Western Chou Dynasty and even in the early Spring and Autumn Period do not show any remarkable difference from those in the Shang Dynasty. Among the large numbers of farm tools discovered at the old site of Fenghsi in Sian, Shensi, of the Western Chou period, there was not a single piece of ironware, nor was there one made of bronze. Most of the tools discovered

here are bone shovels, harvesting tools of oyster shell in the shape of a sickle or knife, and of stone in the shape of a knife, and rice processing tools including stone pestles and mortars. According to written records, wooden plows were also in wide use at that time. Fenghsi was situated in Fengkao district, the political center of the Western Chou Dynasty. The low level of development of social productive forces here spoke for other areas. Naturally, it would be hardly possible to carry out large-scale land cultivation, deep plowing and intensive farming by means of these farm tools made of wood, stone, bone and oyster shell.

By the late Spring and Autumn period, major development was made in the manufacture and use of ironware, when production tools made of iron began to be used in agricultural production. In the areas of the former states of Hsü, Ch'u, Han, Chao and Wei of ancient China, there have been unearthed some iron utensils including rakes and chisels in the shape of the character " 凵 ." Most of these iron tools were small farm implements and other tools, which showed a rather mature form of craftsmanship. Precisely because of the initial use of ironware in agricultural production, individual productive labor with a single household as the unit became possible, and conditions for replacement of the old relations of production under the slave system by the new relations of production under the feudal system gradually ripened. This was the key to the big social change during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. But, we must also see that such iron production tools, as new things, were not yet widely distributed in the area at that time. Production tools or other implements of iron have not yet been discovered from the former sites of the Spring and Autumn period, such as Houma in Shansi, K'ehsingchuang at Fenghsi, Shensi, and Pishakang at Chengchow, which have been excavated systematically. This shows that ironware at that time was still at its initial stage of development and had not yet taken the dominating position in agricultural production.

The development of ironware had been very slow during the thousand years from the time of the old site at Kaocheng of the Shang Dynasty to the last years of the Spring and Autumn period. Iron is a metal much cheaper than bronze, and iron ore is far more widely distributed than copper and tin ores. The temperature required in extracting spongeform iron from iron ore is not much higher than that required in refining bronze. Judged from the fragments of blue-glaze pottery found from the relics of the Western Chou Dynasty at Fenghsi, this temperature was already achieved at that time (blue-glaze pottery of the same quality had already appeared during the period of the Erhlikang Culture of the Shang Dynasty, which preceded the period of the culture of the Yin relics). Under the condition that copper refining had already attained a rather high technical level during the Yin and Shang dynasties in China, it wouldn't be too difficult technically to forge iron ore into wrought iron. Why was it that the development of ironware was so very slow?

Historically, the emergence and development of a newborn thing often went through a rather long period of groping and practice. However, it was not technique, but the relations of production and the social system, which determined the rate of ironware development.

From the development of the slave system to the Western Chou and the Spring and Autumn period, there was already formed a declining, corrupt and reactionary social system. Under the slave system, the foundation of the relations of production was the ownership of the means of production and producers by slave owners. The producers were slaves whom the slave owners could trade or butcher as animals. The slave was forced to work by the whip of the slave owner. The slave himself was totally uninterested in production and did not have the slightest initiative. The slave-owning aristocrats led a luxurious and easy life; they were reluctant to improve the production tools, nor were they willing to allow the slaves to use more expensive tools. Resorting to coercion they forced slaves to work with the crudest and the most clumsy tools. It was precisely this extremely savage and brutal slave system which seriously hindered the development of the productive forces at that time. Particularly when ironware began to be used in agricultural production during the late Spring and Autumn period, the contradiction between the development of social productive forces and the old relations of production under the slave system became still more acute. Without changing the old relations of production under the slave system, widespread use and popularization of ironware would be impossible.

Marx pointed out: "When developing to a certain stage, the material productive forces in society will come into conflict with the existing relations of production or property relations (a legal term for the relations of production). So, these relations become a hindrance to the productive forces. By that time, the era of social revolution will have arrived." ("Preface to the Critique of Political Economy")

II

Social life during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods was full of extraordinarily acute and violent class struggle. The slaves at first fled in large numbers. The State of Liang perished in 642 B.C. because it was "short of people." This was followed by massive slave riots and uprisings. During the late Spring and Autumn period, Liuhsia Chih rose in an uprising. He "led 9,000 followers overrunning the world, attacking the vassals." "His name was as bright as the sun and the moon and was passed on forever to future generations with the names of Yao and Shun." These large-scale exodus, riots and uprisings of the slaves and common people seriously shook the rule of slave-owning aristocrats, shook and smashed the social foundation of the slave system, and made possible the establishment and development of the relations of production under the new feudal system.

On the basis of class struggles launched by slaves and common people against slave-owning aristocrats, and to meet the needs of changed relations of production, the newly emerging landlord class seized political power in one state after another, actively pushed the Legalist line, unfolded the reform movements, and changed the old relations of production under the slave system.

After a century of violent class struggles, by the middle Warring States period, new feudal relations of production basically shaped up in various states.

At that time, the system of ownership, men's interrelations in production and relations of distribution changed fundamentally. Liberated from the slave status, peasants won some personal freedom, and some even acquired a certain amount of land and production tools, enjoying some of their own products. So they began to be interested in production. The laboring masses are the basic productive forces in society. Any substantial development of social productive forces is closely related to the enthusiasm of the laboring masses for production. It is precisely this feudal individual agricultural economy that called for more and better iron instruments, and to consolidate the economic foundation of its rule, the newly emerging landlord class which had seized political power also called for economic development.

Engels pointed out: "The means of production, liberated from its fetters, are the only prerequisite to continuously accelerating the development of the productive forces and, therefore, are also the only prerequisite to the infinite growth of production itself." ("Socialism: Utopian and Scientific")

The first large-scale development of ironware in Chinese history, that is, the domination of iron production instruments in all sectors of production, began in the middle Warring States period.

Judging from the results of underground digging by archaeologists, the early Warring States period had greater varieties and quantities of ironware than the Spring and Autumn period, but the sites where these tools have been unearthed were concentrated in the areas of the former states of Han, Chao, Wei, Hsü and Ch'u. Most of them were small iron utensils and small farm tools, and ironware had still not replaced stone, oyster-shell and bronze wares as the dominating factor in production. This obviously was because the newly-established feudal relations of production were not stable yet and the remnants of the relations of production under the slave system and the old forces of slave-owning aristocrats in the spheres of the superstructure were still rather powerful. By the middle Warring States period when the feudal system of land ownership had been practically established, a brand new situation appeared. The use of ironware was popularized on an unprecedentedly large scale throughout the country. Iron instruments of the period of the Warring States have been unearthed since the liberation in the vast areas, including those of the seven warring states, from Liaoning in the north to Kwangtung in the south, from the Shantung Peninsula in the east to Szechwan and Shensi in the west. The varieties of ironware increased, used for many respects of social production and everyday life. Farm tools included plowshares, mattocks, spades, rakes, shovels and sickles; handicraft tools included axes, knives and chisels; and weapons included swords, daggers, arrowheads, big arrows, etc. Some chapters in "Kuan Tzu" give detailed accounts of the names of iron tools used in various sectors and hold that these iron tools were necessary in "farming," "transport" and "needlework." ("On Light and Heavy Work") They also point out

emphatically: "Without all these, it is impossible for anyone to achieve his work." ("Chapter on Hai Wang") This is roughly a picture of the conditions prevailing at that time.

The big development of ironware was expressed most prominently in the substitution of ironware for wooden and stone farm tools and its leading position in agricultural production. Iron farm tools accounted for 65 percent of the total number of farm tools unearthed in a former site of the state of Chao at Chuangts'un, Shihchiachuang municipality, Hopei province. The batch of iron molds discovered at Hsinglung, Hopie, included 40 sets comprising 87 pieces. Of them, 28 sets comprising 52 pieces belonged to farm tools, accounting for 70 percent. Of the farm tools unearthed in the former site of the state of Yen at Lienhuapao in Fushun, Liaoning, over 90 percent were iron. All these were mainly sites from the middle Warring States period. What a major change this was compared with Western Chou and the Spring and Autumn periods!

The popular use of iron farm tools made possible large-scale cultivation of land, deep plowing and intensive farming. Among the unearthed iron farm tools of the Warring States period, the mattock represented a large quantity. This was historical evidence of the large-scale felling of trees and cultivation of wasteland at that time. This also reflected in a certain degree the policy of "farming and war" advocated by the Legalists at that time. Substituting iron plowshares for wooden plows provided material conditions for the development and popularization of the use of draft cattle. The pick is a tool for tilling soil to a great depth. Besides being used in digging and turning up the soil, the rake and the shovel are also tools for weeding and soil loosening. The sickle is a tool for harvest. The appearance of these iron farm tools showed that there had already been rather complete sets of tools for agricultural production and that farming techniques had in the main altered.

The use of ironware also created important conditions for large-scale construction of water conservation projects. During the early Warring States period, Hsimen Pao, as governor of the Yeh prefecture, conducted water from the Chang River to irrigate the people's fields. After the middle Warring States period, some large-scale water conservation projects, such as the Tuchiang Dam and the Chengkuo Canal in the state of Ch'in and, some time later, the Ling Canal, were constructed. The Chengkuo Canal, construction of which started in the time of Ch'in Shih Huang, was more than 300 li long, from the Ch'ing to the Lo rivers, linking up a network of water courses, irrigating more than 40,000 hectares of land north of Hsienyang, and turning the areas of Kuanchung into "fertile districts in the basin of the Ching and Wei rivers." Farm output increased greatly.

In the handicraft sector, iron tools also gradually replaced bronze tools. Almost all the tools found in the ancient bone tools workshop at Hsiatu in the state of Yen were made of iron in a great variety. There were also tools for special purposes.

The emerging metallurgy was the most important new handicraft industry during the Warring States period. Within the city walls of Lintzu, Shantung, which was formerly in the state of Ch'i, there were four metallurgical sites dating back to the Warring States period, the biggest of which occupied an area of about 400,000 square meters. In Yi hsien, Hopei, three metallurgical sites totalling 300,000 square meters in area were also discovered in what was formerly the city of Hsiatu of the state of Yen. Iron molds were found in the former metallurgical sites of the state of Yen located in Hsinlung hsien and in the former site of the state of Chao located in Poyang city, Tz'u hsien, Hopei. These molds could be reused again and again, saving time and labor in making earthen molds; they were also relatively fine in quality. Tested scientifically, the iron axe of the state of Chao unearthed in Shihchiachuang, Hopei, was found to be a forged product of the early period. Through the softening process, its carbon content and metallic structure were changed, overcoming the fragility problem. Thus the technique of making ironware advanced a step further, fully demonstrating the intelligence and resources of the Chinese laboring people and the high technical standard of metal processing.

The development of agriculture and handicrafts led to an expansion of social division of labor, thereby also promoting the prosperity of commerce and the growth of large cities. From the middle Warring States period, various aspects of social life in China had gone through striking changes.

During the initial period of the establishment of feudal society, social productive forces indeed developed substantially. This, however, did not take place spontaneously. Nor was it because the new productive forces had fully been developed before the old relations of production could be changed. On the contrary, it was on the basis of the class struggle waged by slaves and commoners against the slave-owning aristocrats, through the seizure of political power by the newly emerging landlord class, the positive enforcement of the Legalist line, the destruction of the old relations of production under the slave system and the establishment of new relations of production under the feudal system, that vast possibilities were provided for the development of the social productive forces. Peasants and handicraftsmen liberated from the fetters of the slave system were a huge motive force for the development of production in feudal society; they were also the actual creators of the new production tools. After the establishment of the relations of production under the feudal system, the substantial development of the social productive forces was brought about entirely through the hard work of peasants and handicraft laborers.

III

With the feudal system in the main established, the vigorous development of social productive forces encountered two kinds of resistance: One was the state of rivalled principalities, and the other was the restorationist activities of the remnant forces of the slave-owning aristocrats. These two kinds of forces--the feudal secessionist forces and the slave-owner restorationist forces--always collaborated closely with each other.

Stalin pointed out: "Without eliminating feudal dismemberment and wars among the princes, no country in the world can hope to maintain its independence, develop its culture and economy, and firmly establish its independence." ("Greetings on the 800th Anniversary of Moscow")

A political representative of the newly emerging landlord class, Ch'in Shih Huang continued to push the Legalist line in accordance with the objective requirements of historical development. Having unified China in a short period of time, he establish a united, feudal country of centralized power and effected a series of major reforms in the political, economic and cultural sectors, promulgating the decree requiring "the people to report their landholdings and pay taxes," a decree aimed at promoting agricultural development. Although the rule of Ch'in lasted only a dozen years, the social economy still developed to a certain extent. In respect to ironware, large-sized iron farm implements began to appear. The iron plows of the Warring States period unearthed from a big tomb of the middle Warring States period discovered at Chouwei village, Hui hsien, and unearthed from the ruins of Hsiatu of the state of Yen at Yi hsien, were iron plows with wooden handles. But those unearthed near the Tomb of Ch'in Shih Huang were all-iron plows with 25-centimeter-long blades. This showed that there had been a marked development in iron farm implements used in plowing. As the Ch'in Dynasty was short-lived, the enormous role of a unified country of centralized power in promoting the development of social productive forces had yet to be demonstrated.

After the death of Ch'in Shih Huang, Chao Kao, representing the slave-owner restorationist forces, seized political power. From that time on, there was nearly a century of serious struggles between restoration and counter-restoration, followed by the peasant uprisings led by Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang. In the early period of the Han Dynasty, there was a relatively stable period politically and economically. By the time of Liu Ch'e, Emperor Wu of Han, China as a unified country of centralized power was generally consolidated, and its political system was more noticeable in greatly promoting the development of social production.

Emperor Wu of Han was an able figure in history. He used Sang Hung-yang and other Legalists to continue to push the Legalist line. After protracted fighting, he defeated the slave-owning aristocrats of the Huns. At the same time, he enforced government operation of the salt and iron industries and forbade minting by vassal states, thereby dealing further blows to the powerful local secessionist forces. At that time, metallurgy had become a very important economic sector in the social life of the Han Dynasty. Prior to Emperor Wu of Han, the salt and iron industries were in private hands. As a result, a handful of local princes, gentry and big landlords manipulated them and gained huge profits by using the labor of poor peasants and slaves. The seven states including Wu and Ch'u, and some big slave-owners in industry and commerce staged revolts by utilizing their formidable economic power, posing a serious threat to the central government.

Government monopoly of salt and iron enforced by Emperor Wu was an important measure for strengthening the central government and resisting against the Hun slave-owning aristocrats. It greatly weakened the feudal secessionist forces and the forces of the slave owners in industry and commerce, and met the demand of historical progress.

An important step taken by Emperor Wu in enforcing the government monopoly of salt and iron was to install more than 40 government supervisors in iron producing areas throughout the country. Relics unearthed showed that: One government supervisor usually took charge of management of iron refining workshops in more than one place. These government-operated iron refining workshops provided agriculture and handicrafts with large quantities of iron tools including large farm tools like plowshares, thereby promoting the development of agricultural production; at the same time, ironware and the techniques of refining iron were introduced to remote border areas and areas of minority nationalities.

The second large-scale development of ironware in Chinese history took place during the reigns of Emperors Wu, Chao and Hsüan in the middle Western Han period when government monopoly of salt and iron was vigorously enforced.

Judging from the relics unearthed, more iron instruments after the era of Emperor Wu of West Han were discovered than before it. A lot of them made after the middle Western Han period were unearthed not only in the Central Plains, but in some remote regions such as Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow. There were more varieties of ironwares than the Warring States period. From each of the eight residential houses of Western Han found at Santaoho in Liaoyang, Liaoning, was unearthed a batch of iron farm tools, including plowshares, seeders, mattocks, spades, rakes, hoes and sickles. The big iron plowshare measured 40 centimeters long, widening to 42 centimeters at the upper end, and 12 centimeters thick. In Lung hsien and Lich'uan hsien, Shensi province, there were also discovered big plowshares mounted with an iron blade. This showed that draft cattle had already been in wide use in these areas after the middle Western Han period. The use of these large plowshares naturally greatly increased the depth of the soil tilled by draft cattle. The appearance of seeders demonstrated that seeding carts were also used in sowing seeds at that time. These seed carts not only increased the speed of seeding and adjusted the quantity of seeds sown, but also played a role in opening furrows and loosening the soil. With regard to the making of weapons, although more and more iron weapons were made during the early Han period, bronze weapons still occupied the leading position. But after Emperor Wu, iron weapons gradually replaced bronze weapons to take the leading position. In daily life, ironware also was in wider use. Iron pots gradually replaced the earthen pots. Scissors and choppers began to appear. The large-scale development of ironware produced deep influences on raising the level of agricultural production and changing the habits in people's everyday life.

Metallurgy also developed tremendously in this process. In many metallurgical workshops, mining, iron refining and manufacture of finished

products were carried out in a smooth order. The ruins of metallurgical works of West Han in T'iehshengkou in Kung hsien, Honan, served as important evidence. In the vicinity of these ruins were rich resources of iron and coal. In the ruins were discovered rows of iron furnaces, which differed in shape according to different uses. They included furnaces for refining sponge iron, furnaces in rows, rectangular furnaces, circular furnaces for directly refining wrought iron, low-temperature furnaces for refining steel, and reverberatory furnaces for refining low-carbon steel. Furnaces for the same purpose were put together. The ore had to be dressed before being fed into a furnace. Near the furnaces were discovered charcoal, crude coal, and coal briquettes for use separately in furnaces of different shapes. In addition, there were also smelting furnaces and forging furnaces. Here, the metallurgical processes were in good order, the equipment was in rather complete sets, most of the tools used were made of iron, and farm implements were produced in the main. This fully showed the huge size of the metallurgical workshops after Emperor Wu of Western Han and their close relationship to the development of agricultural production. With regard to the iron-refining techniques, an important development was that there had been a great improvement in the techniques of treating cast iron through tempering and softening. As a scientific analysis revealed, the iron axe unearthed at Hsuehch'eng, Shantung, was made of cast iron treated by softening, and the whitish matter had been totally eliminated, resulting in black-core forged iron with ferreous essence. The knives unearthed at Santaoho and the swords unearthed at Changsha were made of excellent high-carbon steel, medium-carbon steel and forged iron. The iron swords unearthed at Changsha were made by repeated treatments of forging and tempering. These reflected the high-standard achievements in metallurgical skills at that time.

This large-scale development of ironware production after Emperor Wu of Western Han fully demonstrated the huge role of the political system of a united country of central power in promoting social production after the mopping up of the remnant forces of the slave owners by peasant uprisings toward the end of the Ch'in Dynasty and with the relative stability of the political power of the newly emerging landlord class.

IV

Chairman Mao teaches us: "When the relations of production remain unchanged and the productive forces cannot develop, any change in the former will play the principal decisive role." "When the superstructure, including the political and cultural spheres, hinders the development of the economic base, political and cultural reforms will become principal and decisive."

The course of development of ironware in ancient China forcefully testifies to the correctness, profundity and importance of Chairman Mao's teachings.

Following the discovery and gradual use of ironware, individual production gradually became possible, and the feudal system of land ownership was bred and developed step by step within the slave society. This eventually caused drastic social changes, pushing social history to a new stage.

But, drastic social changes did not come about spontaneously and peacefully with the development of productive forces. Although the old system was disintegrating, the handful of corrupt, declining reactionary forces representing the moribund old system would never give up their position but would wage a death-bed struggle. In the course of the new system defeating the old, there would invariably be an acute and savage class struggle, and the new system would come into being only through revolution.

The first large-scale development of ironware in ancient China took place during the middle Warring States period. This was an outcome of the replacement of the reactionary slave system by the newly emerging feudal system. The second large-scale development of ironware took place during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han. This again was an outcome of telling blows dealt to the restorationist forces of slave owners and the feudal secessionist forces, and the consolidation of the united country of centralized power.

"Revolution is the locomotive of history."

Only revolution can smash all trammels fettering the development of productive forces and bring about their substantial development. Only revolution can push history forward without a hitch. In the relations between revolution and production, the former has to take the primary position. Without revolution, it would be impossible to develop production in a real sense. This has been proved by the history of human society, including the history of transition from the slave to the feudal system in ancient China.

This historical truth is the most forceful criticism of the theory of productive forces trumpeted by political swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta. Out of their counter-revolutionary political needs, this handful of political swindlers had gone all out to advocate the reactionary theory of productive forces, blindly clamoring that "technique can cause the whole society to change." Their reactionary purpose was to abolish the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat so as to basically alter the Party's basic line and policies and to realize their sinister ambition of restoring capitalism. As long as we use the incomparably sharp ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought to dissect and analyze it conscientiously and compare it with the objective historical facts, we can easily see through the essence of their flowery speeches.

Our purpose of applying the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method in studying the Chinese ancient history and summing up the historical experience in class struggle and two-line struggle is to raise our consciousness of class struggle and two-line struggle and to enable us to see more clearly the reactionary essence of the various kinds of fallacies disseminated by this handful of revisionists and advance unswervingly along the road indicated by Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line. This will be of vital significance in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

Formulating and Implementing a Program Is a Profound Ideological Revolution

by

Li Chün (李 鈞)
Secretary, CCP Chiating Hsien Committee

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

In 1973, driven by the movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work and to boost agricultural production in our hsien, we, acting in accordance with Chairman Mao's directive, "The hsien Party committee assumes the leadership in drawing up an overall plan," formulated a hsien-wide long-range program for agricultural development for 1974-1980.* And following the publication of the experience of Hsinching brigade, Ant'ing commune, in formulating and implementing its own program,** we at the three levels - the hsien, the commune and the brigade - cooperatively and separately formulated and revised our long-range programs for agricultural development. Today, these long-range programs have produced an extensive influence among the masses all over the hsien, stirring their hearts and inspiring their morale. This has given a boost to the penetrating development of the movement to "learn from Tachai in agriculture," and further improved our hsien's excellent situation.

For the past year, the practice of formulating and implementing plans has given us a lively and concrete education in ideology and political line, deepening our understanding of Chairman Mao's series of directives on the formulation of long-range plans. Formulating and implementing a plan is not a piece of routine work involving "several calculations, filling in forms and drawing up some rules and regulations," nor is it merely a battle to change heaven and earth. Instead it is a major issue bearing on how to continue the revolution and advance unceasingly under the dictatorship of the proletariat. To transform mountains and rivers presupposes the need to change the old thoughts and concepts in our heads. Only by taking the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius as the key link, continuously unfolding a heated struggle between two lines and two ways of thinking and making the process of formulating and implementing a plan one of conducting education in ideology and political line among the vast masses of cadres and commune members is it possible to continuously raise the socialist consciousness of the cadres and commune members, to set good plans, and to have a reliable guarantee for their realization.

---

* See SPRCM, No. 794.

** See SPRCM, No. 789.

Is it necessary to draw up a plan and what attitude should we take in doing so? This is a question we first encountered in formulating a long-range program. On this question, we have learned our lessons. Our hsien, located in the suburbs, has relatively good production conditions. However, in the past few years, agricultural production advanced slowly. In 1970, in its editorial "Learn from Tachai in Agriculture," Jen-min Jih-pao pointed out, "Hsiyang, in becoming a Tachai-type hsien, has posed a very sharp question to the leading comrades in various hsien: Can you do what Hsiyang has done? If you cannot do it in one year, what about two or three years? You may perhaps do it in four or five years!" At that time, we proposed building a Tachai-type hsien in 2-3 years and doubling the grain output target set in the "National Program for Agricultural Production." But in these three years, annual per-mow output hovered around 1,400 catties. Why? In 1973, with the help of the leading comrades of the municipal Party committee, we called a meeting of the standing committee of the hsien Party committee, an enlarged meeting of the hsien Party committee and a meeting of cadres at three levels. With the criticism of Lin Piao and the rectification of the style of work as the key link and Hsiyang hsien as the example, we urged the cadres and the masses to find out the causes of the stagnant farm output in our hsien over the past years. We learned that the chief reason was that the leading group of the hsien Party committee had loosened its grip of the idea of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had become blindly self-complacent and displayed right-deviating conservatism, short of the revolutionary spirit of changing heaven and earth. Unlike Tachai's poor and lower-middle peasants who are ambitious and farsighted, daring to make revolution, to innovate and to bring about big changes, we were content with doing things by rule of thumb, afraid of taking risks. Doing patchwork, we did not want to do merit but sought to avoid demerit. While talking about building a Tachai-type hsien in two or three years, we were actually tardy in action and undetermined. This showed that whether we wanted to work in a big way and dared to do so and whether we were actually doing so was a serious test to our hsien Party committee and to the leading groups at all levels. We can lead the masses to forge ahead only when we rid our minds of the idea of muddling through. Having found the causes and unified our views, and while overcoming the contradictions, we drew up a hsien-wide long-range program. Vigorously criticizing the ideas of stagnation, pessimism, incompetence, conceit and self-complacence, we marched on production in depth and breadth. Good results were achieved in 1973. In the first half of that year, due to natural disasters rarely seen in history, the hsien suffered a drop of over 18 million catties of summer grain. Not disheartened at all, we proudly said: "Let's make up the loss with early autumn and later crops." Free from worries, we turned bad things into good and a slogan into a reality. The gross grain output of the hsien increased by 37 million catties compared with 1972, and the annual per-mow output jumped by 186 catties to reach 1,593 catties. The margin of increase in gross and per-unit-area output greatly surpassed the sum total in the preceding three years, and eleven communes doubled the target set in the "Program."

During the high tide of agricultural cooperativization, Chairman Mao pointed out: "The present problem is still that Right conservatism is creating mischief in many respects, with the result that work in many fields fails to suit the development of objective conditions. The present problem is that many people do not think they can do those things which can be done with effort. Therefore, it is entirely necessary to continuously criticize those Right conservative ideas which really exist." Studying this teaching of Chairman Mao's warmed our hearts. A sharp contrast between 1973 -- when we started drawing up the long-range program -- and the preceding three years made us realize that the current problem was still that Right conservatism was creating mischief in many respects. The result was that many things that could have been done were not done and other things were done with half-hearted efforts. Consequently, high yields could not be attained, and output, far from being kept steady, declined. In short, only when we smashed Right conservatism and raised our consciousness of continuing the revolution could we march in broad strides and energetically boost output. Right conservatism was an obstacle to continuing revolution and to drawing up and carrying out any plan. Only by continuously fighting against Right conservatism and the force of habit of muddling through could we continuously harden our determination to continue the revolution, formulate an advanced and practical plan and achieve remarkable results.

When it comes to formulating and implementing a program for agricultural development, it is also necessary, simultaneously with enforcing the various rural policies at the present stage, to smash individualist and departmentalist ideas, namely the amplified small-peasant ideas, to continue to display the spirit of proletarian collectivism, and correctly handle the relations between the part and the whole and between immediate and long-term interests.

China is a socialist country, and the rural commune economy is socialist collective economy. Fundamentally speaking, the State, the collective and the individual share the same interests. But on some specific problems, there are sometimes also contradictions between them. For instance, in building irrigation projects, roads and bridges and in introducing garden farming, some collective units which will benefit more demand quicker and stronger actions, while those which are to benefit less call for slower speed and a smaller scale. Those which will receive no benefit but will even sustain a temporary loss do not want to contribute at all. Due to lack of uniformity in thinking, very often some urgently-needed projects were not carried out quickly, with adverse effect on other projects. Loupei brigade of Lout'ang commune had a 200-meter long waterway which remained undredged for eight years until the formulation of the current long-range program. This was because three of its production teams considered only their narrow interests. Chairman Mao points out: "Paying attention only to the interests of one's own small group and not to overall interests, and acts which do not seem on the surface to give consideration to personal interests but in fact embody extremely narrow-minded individualism--this similarly exerts a very great corrosive and centrifugal effect." Ideas of giving sole consideration to the interests of a small group are

in essence an amplification of the small-peasant ideology, an influence left behind from centuries-old domination of the countryside by the system of private ownership and the old ideologies of the exploiting classes. If this thinking is allowed to get the upper hand, relatively large projects in the program will not be realized. However, the system of "three-level ownership with the team as the foundation" enforced by the people's commune at the present stage must take care of the interests of the commune, the brigade and the production team. Therefore, in handling these problems, we must on the one hand resolutely carry out the existing policies for the countryside and at the same time cannot take things as they are. We must persist in putting proletarian politics in command, grasp the revolution in the ideological sphere properly, continue to instill into the minds of the cadres and masses socialist collectivist ideas and overcome various amplified small-peasant ideas, so that the process of formulating and implementing a plan may become one of conducting education on socialist collectivism and on our long-term prospects among the cadres and commune members. In this way, partial interests may be consciously subordinated to the overall interests and immediate interests to long-term ones.

A year of practice in formulating and implementing the program in our hsien shows that where ideological education has been properly carried out, there problems have been handled properly and the thinking of the cadres and masses has been enhanced. There are some flower plots separating the fields of the various production teams of Hsinching brigade, Ant'ing commune. In the past, due to the existence of the small-peasant economic thinking, each team regarded its own plots as treasure and those of others as a garbage heap. As a result, no adjustment had been made for years, and this affected arrangements and management of harvesting and planting. Last year, when the program was being drawn up, the Party branch of the brigade, taking the criticism of Lin Piao and the rectification of the style of work as the key link, stepped up the education in socialist collectivism. The poor and lower-middle peasants said: Lin Piao maliciously attacked the people's communes and disparaged the peasants as "inadequately fed and clothed." We must give full play to the superiority of the people's commune which is "large in size and fair in distribution" and enlarge the collective economy. Without adjusting the flower plots, how can it suit the mechanization of farming? Without getting rid of the amplified small-peasant ideology, how can we build up a large-scale socialist agriculture? The cadres and the masses have not only adhered to the policies of voluntariness and mutual benefit and exchange of equal value, but have also developed the Dragon River style. Since last winter, they have successively adjusted over 30 mow of flower plots, thus considerably facilitating the development of garden farming. To improve its irrigation facilities, Litzuyüan brigade of T'aop'u commune planned to excavate a 600-meter long waterway. One of its production teams opposed the idea because it would have to lose some of its farmland. Thereupon, the brigade Party branch, in order to settle the thinking of this team's cadres, studied with them Chairman Mao's teaching on planning, enabling them to see not only their partial and immediate interests but also the collective and long-term interests and to realize more deeply that the formulation and implementation of plans would create well-being not only for this generation but also for

future generations. They also made this calculation: although 4-5 mow of farmland were lost, the loss could be made up by harder efforts on the remaining 100-odd mow of farmland; when the new waterway was dug and the old one filled up, 5-6 mow of land might be made available and the production potential might then be greater. This quickly unified thinking and action began immediately. Examples such as this made us understand that setting up the concept of the whole and developing the spirit of socialist collectivism have a great bearing on the formulation and implementation of long-range programs. It is necessary to continue educating the cadres and commune members so they will, proceeding from the interests of the whole Party and the people of the whole country, become farsighted enough to properly unify the partial needs of a hsien, a commune or a brigade with the overall needs of the State and see to it that things which ought to be done are done with resolve. Thus, with a single point of departure, all of us will unite in thought and work in concert.

In conducting education on socialism and collectivism among cadres and commune members and in correctly handling the relations between the whole and the part and between long-term and immediate interests, it is imperative to act according to Chairman Mao's teaching: "In making plans, doing things and pondering problems, we must never fail to take into consideration the fact that China has a population of 600 million." We must not pay one-sided attention to partial and immediate interests or we will go astray. Last year, when we began drawing up the program, we believed that since the rural housing situation was tight in recent years, we should build more new estates for commune members in order to improve the housing conditions in the countryside. As we under-estimated the socialist enthusiasm of the broad masses and their consciousness of taking the whole situation into account and as we failed to put the relations between the development of production and the improvement of livelihood in proper perspective, we proposed to build 150,000 square meters of new estates for commune members last winter and spring, nearly one block of flats per brigade. When this plan was turned over to the masses for discussion, many poor and lower-middle peasants said that we must learn from the Tachai brigade's spirit of "first harnessing the slopes and then our dwellings," that we should change the conditions of collective production before changing the conditions of personal life. A plan which failed to differentiate between primary and secondary needs would not conform to the spirit of arduous struggle. At the same time, the poor and lower-middle peasants highly aspired to the mechanization of rice transplanting, demanding quicker and wider use of power-operated transplanters. Later, we revised the plan, reduced the speed of building estates, and quickened the speed of producing transplanters. As a result, 43 percent of the fields for this year's late rice were transplanted by machines, thus insuring timely transplanting of late rice seedlings. These two episodes showed us that if we aroused the enthusiasm of the masses by thinking only of partial and immediate interests, we would in fact have thwarted their collectivist thinking and dampened their socialist enthusiasm.

Setting a long-range program for agricultural development "enables people not to confine their vision to the very step they are about to take." Instead, it inspired the broad masses and cadres in our hsien with the

lofty will of building a socialist new countryside at a higher speed and on a bigger scale. But there were some comrades who asked with misgiving: Would drawing up a long-range program and going in for farmland capital construction in a big way interfere with current production? On this question, we also have had a course of understanding. Several years ago, in order to change production conditions, the poor and lower-middle peasants in many areas of our hsien called for large-scale farmland irrigation construction. Because we were afraid that current production would be affected, we not only refused to support such initiative of the masses but even criticized it. As a result, farmland irrigation construction in our hsien proceeded on and off, and production made no rapid progress. Recently, we reviewed the conditions of agricultural development in our hsien over the past years. In the winter of 1970 and 1973, we built more water works on the farms than was the case normally in recent years, and the summer crops in 1971 and 1974 registered substantial increases. In the winter of 1972 we built very few irrigation projects, and the summer crop of 1973 showed the heaviest drop in recent years. Similarly, Tengt'a brigade No. 2 of Chuch'iao commune has been a high-yield unit in our hsien with a per-mow grain output of over 2,000 catties for three consecutive years. In drawing up its plan, it reviewed the fighting course of learning from Tachai over the last ten years when it found that during this period it had effected at one time and another three major reforms in respect to soil improvement, revision of the farming system and per-unit-area yield, and there appeared three big leaps in output. These facts showed that only by bringing about a major change in agricultural production conditions would it be possible to achieve great leaps in production. Therefore, carrying out a long-range program, going in for farmland irrigation construction in a big way and improving agricultural production conditions will not only not adversely affect current production but stimulate it. On the other hand, if we pay sole attention to the present and no attention to the future, and dare not change things boldly for fear of adversely affecting current production, we will become very passive and never succeed in boosting farm output.

There may be some conflict between future and current needs, and problems may be caused by improper arrangements in specific field of work. Take farmland irrigation construction for instance. After the enthusiasm of the masses has been whipped up, if the hsien, the commune and the brigade all want to build more water works in the coming winter and spring, and if they relax their normal efforts to tend the fields, this would surely affect current production adversely. Good, all-round arrangements are needed. Chairman Mao points out: We not only "must conduct constant, lively and earnest political education among the masses, but should also constantly explain to them the difficulties that have arisen and study with them the ways of solving such difficulties." The practice shows that while formulating and implementing a program, as long as we seriously arouse and rely on the masses, they will find the means of solving the contradictions. When laying an agricultural development program in the "three-autumn" period of 1973, Chinchialung production team of Kaochia brigade, Fengpin commune, put forward the slogan, "Achieve garden farming in three years by re-ordering our land and drawing up our blueprint."

At that time, some people thought that the introduction of garden farming, involving a high volume of engineering work, might affect field management, that when many pieces of land were levelled, mature soil might become raw soil and current production might suffer. Thereupon, the cadres and masses of the team together studied the ways of solving the contradictions. Besides tightening field management of winter crops, they increased the rate of garden farming construction, with the result that 47 percent of the farmland in the team took the garden shape. Having regard to the fact that after the land was levelled, mature soil might become raw soil and consumption of manure would be large, the commune members were aroused to collect natural manure in a big way and to apply an adequate amount of basic manure so as to increase output in the same year. These facts also taught us that formulating and implementing a program entailed the need to combine a lofty ambition with a down-to-earth scientific attitude. To do this, in the final analysis, it is necessary to fully muster and rely on the masses. Only when the masses are aroused and take the formulation and implementation of plans as their own business will long-term planning be closely integrated with current production. Now, under the slogan "think ahead, work hard now to achieve our goals by all means," the cadres and masses in our hsien are energetically stepping up current field management with a view to securing a bumper autumn harvest this year. On the other hand, they are collecting manure in a big way and systematically carrying out water-control and soil-improvement measures in order to lay the foundation for gaining a rich summer crop next year.

We have only taken the first step in our work of formulating and implementing long-range plans, and we have not done enough. There is still a long way to go before meeting the demands of the Party and the people. We are determined, guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, to penetratingly criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, further raise our consciousness of class struggle, line struggle and continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must be humble and prudent and guard against rashness and arrogance. We must closely rely on the broad masses of people and cadres and pledge to build our hsien into a Tachai-type hsien--a new socialist Chiating.

* * *

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Study and Criticism, No. 8, Aug. 20, 1974

Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Combating and Preventing Revisionism

On Shang Yang's Conception of History - by K'ang Li and Shih Yüeh (SPRCM No. 790)

On Li Ssu - by Wang Shao-p'u & Li Ch'ang-ch'ing (SPRCM No. 794)

Li Chih's Idea of Honoring Legalism and Opposing Confucianism as Seen from "Shih Kang P'ing Yao" - by Wang Jung-kang and others

Why the Reactionaries Have to Applaud Wu Hsün - by Shih Shang-hui (SPRCM No. 793)

Lin Piao's Right Military Line as Seen from the Strategic Shift in the Early Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan - by Yü Tzu-tao (SPRCM No. 789)

Socialism Is Without Ancient Precedent - by Ch'ang Hsiang (SPRCM No. 790)

Study of Economic Problems

Down with Underestimation of Oneself - by Chin Feng (SPRCM No. 789)

What the Struggle between "Dragon" and "Tiger" Shows - Investigation report on technological innovation by the tubing group of Shanghai Dyeing Chemical Work No. 10 - by Ch'en K'o-chien and Wu Yüeh-hua

Nine Years of Scientific Experiment - by the Glass Group of 3rd Workshop of Shanghai Electric Bulb Factory

Strengthen the Ranks of Marxist Theorists

Young Workers on the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle (Concluded) (SPRCM No. 793)

Literary Criticism

On Anti-Confucian Thinking in Lu Hsün's Novels - by Shen Yüeh (SPRCM No. 793)

Comment on San-kuo Yen-i's Honor-Confucius and Anti-Legalist Ideology - by Yen Chi (SPRCM No. 793)

A Victory for Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line on Education--Read "New Classrooms," a collection of short stories and essays - by Liu Ch'ing-i

Study and Apply Philosophy

Direct Railway Transportation from the Viewpoint of the Whole - by the Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai Railway Sub-Bureau

Transplanting of Seedlings Doesn't Require One to Bend One's Back - by the CCP Committee of Wanghsin Commune, Chiating Hsien

Sum Up Experience in Educational Revolution

The Road of "July 21" Is Getting Broader--Investigation report on training of technicians among workers - by a reporter of this journal

Make an Effort to Run Correspondence Courses Well--Summary of a forum attended by comrades of Shanghai Comfort Mission for rusticated educated youth in Fuyang District, Anhwei

Biographies

Biography of Martyr Fang Chih-min - by Shih Feng

* * *

Study and Criticism, No. 9, Sept. 20, 1974

Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Combating and Preventing Revisionism

The People Are the Motive Power for the Making of History - by Hsüeh Ch'ing-sung (SPRCM No. 797)

Han Fei--Chief Fighter Against Confucius in the Late Warring States Period - by Shih Shang-hui (SPRCM No. 793)

Read "Biography of Kuo Chia, Records of Three Kingdoms" - by Chai Ch'ing

The Struggle between Two Military Lines During the War to Liberate the Northeast - by Yü Hsüeh-chün (SPRCM No. 793)

Ch'en Po-ta's Entire Life of Revering Confucius and Opposing Communism - by Ch'eng Kao (SPRCM No. 794)

The Struggle between the Two Lines in Annotation Work - by Yen Feng

Reveal the Reactionary Features of "Women's Classics" - by the Party Branch of Shift B, Weaving Workshop of Shanghai No. 30 Cotton Textile Mill (SPRCM No. 797)

Make and Effort to Study in Struggle

The Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie in the Bourgeois Revolution--Some understanding from studying "Communist Manifesto" - by Jen Ching (SPRCM No. 797)

Good Teaching Material on Materialist Dialectics--Some understanding from studying Marx's "Manuscript on Mathematics" - by Ch'en Hsi-ch'un, worker of Shanghai Wireless Plant No. 26

Study of Economic Problems

The Wishes of the 460,000 People--Report of an investigation into the formulation and implementation of a long-range program in Chiating Hsien (SPRCM No. 794)

The 1974-1980 Agricultural Development Program of Chiating Hsien (Revised Draft) (SPRCM No. 794)

In Drawing Up a Program, It Is First Necessary to Grasp the Line - by Li Ch'ing-t'ao, secretary of Party committee of Malu Commune, Chiating Hsien

There Is No Limit to Building a New Countryside - by Hsü Cheng-ming, leader of Tengt'a Team No. 2, Chuch'iao Commune, Chiating Hsien

Our Great Goal Is Communism - by Ch'in Ta-ti, poor-peasant commune member of Kolung brigade, Waikang Commune, Chiating hsien

Use Our Hands to Change the Outlook--Investigation report on implementation of a plan for technical transformation through self-reliance in Shanghai's knitting industry

Literary Criticism

A Heroic Image in the Great Cultural Revolution - on the projection of the image of Lei Hai-sheng in the drama "On the Fighting Shipbuilding Platform" - by Wen Yen-p'ing

Warmly Praise the Revolutionary Creative Spirit of the Working Class--after seeing "Scientific Technology No. 3" - by Fang Liang

Sum Up Experience in Educational Revolution

Comment: Persevere in Running Correspondence Courses Well

Set Up Short-Course Training Classes in Rural Areas--by the Correspondence Education Group of Shanghai Maritime Transport College

A Talk on the Experience of Being a Part-Time Teacher--by Wang Yü-tung, Hsü Village Health Center, Wuyuan Hsien, Kiangsi

Persist in Placing the Main Emphasis on Private Study

Miscellaneous Essay: Shylock's New Variant - by Hsi Chi-hsin, worker of Chunghua Shipbuilding Yard

* * *

END

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service
Springfield, Va. 22151

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PRINTED MATTER

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

211

U.S.MAIL

CMP X741231 001
UNIV ILLINOIS LIB AT CHICAGO CIRCLE
LIB SERIALS SEC
BOX 8198
CHICAGO IL 60680